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How Empty is the Idea of Equality?
Kent Greenawalt*
l. INTRODUCTION

The nature of equality and the relationship between equality and justice
have long been puzzling to social and legal philosophers. One manifestation of
these problems of understanding is uncertainty among lawyers and judges
about the significance of legal norms formulated in the language of equality,
most notably the equal protection clause of the Constitution. In an elaborately
reasoned, imaginative, and richly referenced recent article, Peter Westen has
urged the arresting conclusion that the idea of equality is empty,1 empty in the
sense that any normative conclusion derived from the idea could be reached
more directly by reliance on normative judgments cast in other terms. Because
use of this empty idea can create confusion and mistaken judgment, Professor
Westen claims that it burdens discourse about social justice and moral and
legal rights. 2
According to Professor Westen, the basic idea of equality is the notion
that "'people who are alike should be treated alike"'; 3 a correlative of that
notion is that "'people who are unalike should be treated unalike."' 4 To
decide who should be considered alike for any particular purpose, a person or
an organization must make a moral judgment about which characteristics are
relevant. "To .say that people are morally alike is therefore to articulate a
moral standard of treatment-a standard or rule specifying certain treatment
for certain people-by reference to which they are, and thus are to be treated,
alike. " 5 Given the presence of a standard indicating how various people are to
be treated, the idea of equality adds nothing to the determination of proper
treatment, and is therefore superfluous. 6 What counts are the standards one
uses to decide which people are alike and what treatment is appropriate; these
standards are based on the rights that people have. Equality, therefore, is
simply derivative from the rights that people have in a moral, or legal, order. 7
Use of the language of equality is not, however, simply unnecessary,
according to Westen. People are led by that language into confusions, suppos-

* Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence, Columbia University School of Law. B.A. 1958,
Swarthmore College; B. Phil. 1960, Oxford University; LLB. 1963, Columbia University.
I am very grateful to Bruce Ackerman, Vince Blasi, and Henry Monaghan, from whom I
received extensive and extremely valuable criticisms of an early draft, and to Anthony D' Amato
and Benno Schmidt, whose comments aided my final revision of the essay.
I. Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537 (1982).
2. See id. at 592-96.
3. Id. at 539.
4. Id. at 539-40. I discuss this principle infra section 11 B.
5. Id. at 545 (footnote omitted).
6. Id. at 547.
7. Id. at 548-56.
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ing, for example, that equality does imply certain substantive rights, or that
the propriety of treating persons as equal for one purpose suggests the propriety of treating them as equal more generally. 8 The idea of equality therefore
deflects people from, and obscures, the truly crucial judgments about substantive rights, and "should be banished from moral and legal discourse as an
explanatory norm.'' 9
This essay is a response to Professor Westen's analysis and program.
With his definition and arguments in mind, 1 construct a framework for
understanding the idea of equality. I indicate how the general modern conception of that idea is broader than the boundaries he sets, and show how claims
of equality figure in moral and legal argument. More particularly, I suggest
that the idea of equality embraces two rather distinct sorts of notions, the
formal principle of equality, that equals should be treated equally (or that
likes should be treated alike), and what I shall call substantive principles of
equality, such standards as "siblings should be treated equally" and "racial
differences should be considered irrelevant." 10 The formal principle of equality is generally conceded to be self-evident (in some sense), but claims about
substantive principles of equality are more controversial, calling forth competing views about relevant criteria. The focus of Professor Westen's article is on
the formal principle of equality, and upon its corollary about unequal treatment for unequals. As to the formal principle, I show both that Westen
conceives it too restrictively and that he fails to acknowledge the normative
import that is to be found even in his own crabbed version. What I have
labelled substantive principles of equality, Westen declines to consider principles of equality at all, 11 mainly addressing how these differ from the formal
principle. I challenge this definitional move, and also offer some suggestions
about how substantive principles of equality set standards for behavior and
relate to other norms.
This account of concepts of equality provides the basis for a measured
appraisal of Westen's assertion that equality is an empty idea that should be
extirpated from normative discussions. Westen illumines very important limitations to the normative force of judgments of equality, and many of his
cautions about misjudgments that can follow failures to understand those
limitations are well taken and persuasively developed. 12 Nonetheless, the idea
of equality is much richer than he acknowledges. Not only is its banishment

8. Id. at 577-84.
9. Id. at 542.
IO. Not every standard that is employed to decide who should count as equal for what
purposes is a substantive principle of equality. I explore this point more fully infra notes 53-54
and accompanying text. In brief, if the standard is that the fastest runner should win, the
conclusion that in case of a tie there should be co-winners would not require employment of a
principle of equality.
II. See Westen, supra note I, at 541-42; 551-56. Westen talks instead of "'conditional'
rights that entitle a rightholder to whatever benefits other persons enjoy," id. at 554, and of
"quantitatively identical" treatments, id. at 555. See infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
12. See Westen, supra note I, at 577-92.
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from moral and legal argument exceedingly unlikely in fact, but the accomplishment of that objective would probably not produce the enhanced clarification of fundamental questions that Westen seeks. A fuller understanding of
the significance of existing concepts of equality, toward which this essay is
meant to make a modest contribution, is a more promising avenue toward
clarification than is the revolution in conceptual formulation that he proposes.
Though this short essay can be understood without a reading of Westen's
article, it remains very much a responsive effort, not exploring many important questions about equality and not bringing directly to bear on the problem
the extensive literature on equality and justice. Like Westen, my aim is not to
engage in normative analysis of particular problems involving equality; that
is, I do not set out to show that one or another assertion about equal
treatment is substantively correct. I do draw out ethical assumptions that
underlie the use of concepts of equality, showing that those assumptions are
coherent, and suggesting that they may be better conveyed by language of
equality than by any alternatives that come to mind. Whatever ethical conclusions I reach should be understood in that way, not as principles that I here
mean to defend against an attack on their merits. I concentrate primarily on
equality as an aspect of moral evaluation, referring briefly, however, to legal
standards that illustrate how notions of equality operate in normative discourse.
II. THE

FORMAL PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY

Westen powerfully reminds us of a point often made, rarely challenged
directly, but often forgotten: namely, that in the absence of substantive
criteria indicating which people are equal for particular purposes and what
constitutes equal treatment, the formal principle of equality provides no
guidance for how people should be treated. 13 He moves from this accurate
perception to three mistaken conclusions: that the formal principle is without
moral force; 14 that the principle that unequals should be treated unequally is
logically indisputable; 15 that these two principles have no bearing on whether a
"presumption of equality" should be indulged. 16 These conclusions follow
either from overly narrow, counterintuitive constructions of the basic concepts or from analysis that is flawed.
These mistakes evidence a more general failure by Westen to appreciate
how the formal principle of equality can operate in etpical choice. The applicability of the principle provides an additional moral reason for complying
with an established standard of how people are to be treated. In many
situations the principle also affects the substantive conclusions that can prop-

13.
14.
15.
16.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

at
at
at
at

543-48.
542, 547, 550-51.
557-58, 572-73 & nn.124 & 125.
571-73.

1170

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:1167

erly be reached, bearing on whether differences in ultimate treatment are
warranted and, if so, on the methods for determining how choices among
individuals are to be made. Somewhat less directly, the principle also affects
how justifications of unequal treatment should proceed and what should be
done in instances of uncertainty over whether people are relevantly alike or
unalike.
A. The Moral Force of the Formal Principle of Equality

Professor Westen addresses situations in which a firm determination has
·been reached concerning the treatment that should be afforded to different
sorts of people, 17 e.g., educators have decided that people who score over
seventy in an objective examination should pass. Westen is clearly correct that
on such occasions the formal principle of equality ordinarily18 gives no new
insight into what constitutes proper treatment, since it has already been
determined that people should be dealt with in accord with the established
criteria. 19 Even then, however, the principle expresses a moral judgment about
compliance with the criteria. On other occasions the formal principle provides
genuine direction for those establishing standards for treatment because,
contrary to what Westen apparently believes, the principle often comes into
play before standards of treatment have been settled.
Once the content of the formal principle of equality is clarified, these two
points can be easily understood. In the formula "equals should be treated
equally," "equals" are persons who differ in no relevant respect in regard to
the sort of treatment they should receive. Application of the formal principle
thus requires identification of the characteristics that are relevant to whether
people should be getting equal treatment. A judgment must also be made
about what constitutes equal treatment, not an easy task since the same
benefits ($100 a week for medical care) or burdens (a $1000 fine) can have
vastly different impacts on the lives of various people. 20 Often there will be a
strong interrelationship between one's characterization of treatment as equal
or unequal and one's summary of the relevant qualities that make people
equal or unequal. Suppose, for example, a decision is made that all those who
commit a particular crime should receive fines that impinge equally on their

17. See, e.g., id. at 543-48.
.
18. I use this qualifying word because the principle may bear on proper treatment when there
have already been substantial deviations from the accepted standard. See infra text accompanying
note 26.
19. One may, of course, challenge the substantive criteria as wrong, but the formal principle
of equality gives no guidance on that question.
20. Westen recognizes the possibility of uncertainty or disagreement over whether treatments
are equal, but the only difficulty he discusses in this respect is that of identifying what the
established standard of treatment is. Westen, supra note 1, at 558. He asserts that "treatments can
be alike only in reference to some moral rule." Id. at 547. Westen does not advert to the fact that
those who must decide upon criteria of treatment must consider what dispositions are equal as
well as which people should receive equal dispositions. He disregards the possibility that someone
can conclude that treatments are equal without judging whether such treatment is morally
appropriate and even without perceiving the moral reasons that might lead to such treatment.
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lives. Such a standard leads to a higher monetary imposition against a rich
criminal than against a poor one. One can say that the two criminals deserve
and receive equally severe sentences-thus, equals are being treated equally.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

criminals are relevantly unequal because one is richer-on this view, unequals
are (appropriately) being treated unequally. Both characterizations are correct, since the fines are equal in one respect and unequal in another.
People having to decide how to treat others frequently begin with some
doubt over exactly what treatment is appropriate for whom. Confidence that
two or more persons do not differ in any relevant respect sometimes precedes
assurance about what should be done to them, or for them. To take a crystal
clear, if artificial, example, suppose that two identical twins, with identical
family circumstances, jointly commit burglary with apparently equal responsibility. The judge quickly concludes that no distinguishing feature warrants
different sentences for the two, while still agonizing over the comparative
merits of probation or a term in jail. Of course, the judge's conclusion that no
distinguishing features between the two exists does demand substantive judgments about characteristics relevant to sentence, 21 but the conclusion need not
coincide with final settlement upon the proper standard of treatment.
In this setting, the force of the formal principle in constraining acceptable
determinations about sentence is. evident. Suppose the judge believes that
giving one twin probation and the other imprisonment would make a useful
experiment of the respective value of those forms of sentence. Recognizing
that each twin would strongly prefer to be placed on probation, however, the
judge holds back, sensing that treating two "equals" so unequally would be
unfair, 22 even if an independent reason for doing so supports differential
treatment. 23
A variation on this example forcefully illustrates the same point. The
twins are separately tried. The first judge places the first twin on probation.

21. Under a rule of law that the firstborn inherit real property, a crucial distinction would
exist between identical twins.
22. lf the judge thought only that the resentment created in the unfortunate twin would
render his punishment less likely to meet reformative goals, he would be moved not by a genuine
sense of unfairness but by a utilitarian concern that a perception of unfairness by the subject
could render a sentence less useful. The connection between resentment and ideas of unfairness is
explored further, though inconclusively, infra text accompanying note 25.
23. Professor Westen rightly suggests the absurdity of treating a class of people equally by
giving them all the opposite of what they deserve, Westen, supra note 1, at 545-46, but this
observation sidesteps the possible operation of the formal principle to help resolve a proper
standard of treatment. Although ·Westen's position on this issue may not be entirely clear, the
fairest reading of the relevant passages is that he neither fails to see nor denies that a prior
judgment that people should be treated in the same way can affect the choice of standards of
treatment. What he does deny is that the formal principle of equality has anything to say on the
subject, claiming instead that such considerations are matters of comparative rights about which
the language of equality is inapt. See, e.g., id. at 545, 548, 553. See also infra text accompanying
notes 49-50. This severe constriction of both the language of equality and the significance
accorded the formal principle strikes me as plainly unwarranted; and I find in the Article no
systematic defense of his extremely narrow conceptions.
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The second judge believes that imprisonment is the better disposition, but is
pulled toward probation by the feeling that treating the second twin more
harshly would be unfair. A sense that equals should be treated equally may
finally lead the judge to impose a sentence different from that which he would
otherwise have picked.
In other situations, the principle that equals should be treated equally can
affect substantive decisions because the treatment that would be appropriate
for a small number of people would not be appropriate for all those who
should be accorded equal treatment. A school that ordinarily punishes cheating by suspension may hesitate to invoke that penalty upon discovery by a
teacher that an entire class has cooperated in cheating on a particular exam,
even if the authorities assume no difference in the level of guilt of group
cheaters and individual cheaters. 24 A state wishing to confer a benefit upon its
citizens may reconsider upon realizing that under the privileges and immunities clause of article IV the benefit is of the kind that must also be extended to
nonresidents if it is given at all.
If a particular benefit (or burden) cannot be shared equally among all
those who warrant equal treatment, the benefit may not be conferred at all, or
the method for choice of who shall receive it may need to respect the judgment
of relevant equality of the people to whom it might be given. Imagine an
adoption agency unable to place identical ten-year-old twins in the same
home. The best available home is significantly better than the two next best,
and roughly equal, homes, and would be recognized as such by the twins. If
the twins are to be aware of each other's placement and especially if they are
to maintain continuing contact, the agency faces a troublesome decision
whether to place either twin in the most desirable home. Their equality might
be respected by use of a lottery or other random technique to choose who
would get the best home (much as a lottery to select persons for a military
draft symbolizes the equal status of those among whom the choice must be
made); 25 but even that technique might not overcome the worry that it would
be unfair to place the twins in unequal environments. Parental experience with
the demands of children to be afforded privileges given to siblings demonstrates how deeply engrained in the human psyche is the feeling that one
should not get worse treatment than someone else deemed equal. How precisely the resentment felt by people who think their equals are getting better
treatment relates to the ethical sense underlying the formal principle of equal-

24. An interesting feature of this example is that treating the entire class more leniently than
a single offender in the class would have been treated may create an inequity between the members
of this class and individual cheaters in other classes.
25. I am assuming in the text that a process of selection is more feasible than spreading the
burden among all those equally situated. If the two methods are roughly equal in feasibility,
spreading the burden evenly (one year of military service for all those eligible) would be more fair,
and a preferable implementation of the principle that equals should be treated equally, than
imposing a burden twice as heavy on half of those eligible by a random process in which all have
equal chances (two years of military service for the half of those eligible, that half being picked by
lottery).
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ity is beyond the scope of this essay, but the principle may well reflect, in part,
the perceived impropriety of generating such resentment.
Once we acknowledge the directive moral force that the principle of
treating equals equally is perceived to have in these settings, we can see the
kind of moral force it has when the criteria for treatment are previously
settled. If established criteria require that B, with a grade of seventy-one, be
passed, then B has suffered a wrong if he is failed; but the wrong may be
magnified if C, also with a grade of seventy-one, is passed. Here, the formal
principle does not bear on how B should be treated (only redundantly indicating what treatment is called for by established criteria); but it does focus
attention on a separate aspect of the wrong that is done to B if the criteria are
not followed. Occasionally, the formal principle can bear on appropriate
treatment despite the presence of established criteria. When overly generous
deviations from criteria have been made26 (six students in a row with scores of
sixty-nine have been passed by soft-hearted teachers), the formal principle
may underlie a claim for the same treatment by one who asserts that he is
similar (he also has gotten a sixty-nine) to those who have benefited. As in the
instance of sentencing by the second judge, the claim of fairness here stands in
opposition to the general principle that each person should get the treatment
intrinsically most appropriate for him or her.
Contrary to what Professor Westen supposes, 27 the formal principle of
equality is not a necessary logical truth. Not only is unequal treatment of
equals an empirical possibility, substantial reasons, such as the indivisibility of
benefits or the need to experiment, can sometimes support that practice.
Nevertheless, when treatment is being decided for equal humans sensitive to
possible inequalities, 28 the moral power of the formal principle exerts a significant pull against unequal benefits or burdens.
B. Unequals and Unequal Treatment

The principle that unequals should be treated unequally does not deny
that unequals can empirically be treated equally29 or even that reasons for

26. It might be claimed that the deviations show that the "real" standard for treatment is
different from the stated standard for treatment and that the formal principle tells us only that the
real standard should be applied. At least when the deviations are unauthorized (the teachers were
not originally permitted to deviate) and when they result from "weakness of will" rather than
reflective judgment, the difference between the settled standard and actual practice is crucial. The
notion that people should get the treatment deemed most appropriate by those with power to
decide points in favor here of failing the person who has just gotten a 69; the equality principle
points in the opposite direction.
27. His supposition in this respect is the direct result of his narrow conception of the formal
principle. See supra notes 5 & 23.
28. Typically, when persons decide how to treat indistinguishable nonhuman animals, no
moral counter emerges against reasons that favor sharply variant treatment. The same may even
be true with humans who cannot yet perceive, and will continue to be unaware of, unequal
treatment-perhaps the adoption agency can comfortably place new-born identical twins in
unequal homes if contact between the twins is to be severed.
29. However difficult it may be to say what is equal treatment, that determination need not
depend on a judgment about what treatment is morally appropriate. Suppose that 20-year
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doing so may exist, but it asserts that such treatment is unjust. Whether
justifications can be offered for equal treatment of unequals depends on how
the concept of unequals is construed. If unequals are persons who, after all
considerations are taken into account, should get unequal treatment, then, of
course, the very formulation does logically preclude any chance of justified
equal treatment. 30 But the term "unequals" is ordinarily understood in some
narrower sense, relating to the treatment one deserves to receive or would
receive if the purposes behind a program of benefits and burdens could be
perfectly carried out. 31 When "unequals" are so conceived, equal treatment
of them is sometimes, even often, warranted.
During World War II Lord Halifax learned that a leak from the Foreign
Office had been traced to a particular typing pool but could be traced no
further. He told the members of the pool, "I am going to do something very
unjust, but necessary in the interests of national security. There has been a
leak from this pool. I do not know which of you it is. And therefore I am
going to sack you all. " 32 In this instance of equal treatment of persons who
are relevantly unequal, 33 the problem is identifying the person with the charac~
teristic that would warrant unfavorable treatment. In other circumstances,
categorizations established for administrative convenience may require the
same treatment of persons whose difference in relevant characteristics is
clearly perceivable at the time. A grading system with few tiers requires
teachers to give the same grade to papers they consider to be of very different
quality; a statutory compensation scheme with fixed schedules for particular
harms may grant the same award for an injured foot to a professional athlete
and to a sedentary writer. Finally, a decisionmaker might be aware that

sentences with identical conditions arc imposed on a burglar and a murderer, with the same
expected impacts on their lives. One could describe the two as receiving equal treatment, without
believing that the burglar should be getting a sentence as severe as that given the murderer and
without believing that anyone else thinks they should be getting equally severe sentences. (If a
statute simply gave judges broad authority to give any term of imprisonment they thought right, a
lenient judge might give a 20-year sentence to the murderer and a harsh judge such a sentence to
the burglar, though all judges (and legislators) agree that murderers should get more severe
sentences than burglars.) Westen seems to deny the possibility suggested here. Sec supra note 16.
30. That apparently is Westen's view. See Westen, supra note I, at 572-73.
31. One may also talk of "unequals" as those having significantly different characteristics
bearing on proper treatment, even when those differences in charactcristies do not produce any
differences in deserved treatment. If multiple factors arc relevant, two persons very unalike in
individual characteristics (A's paper is sloppy but shows a powerful intellectual grasp of the
subject; B's paper evidences diligent learning at a more pedestrian level) may properly be treated
in the same way (a grade of B + ). That various combinations of relevant factors can lead to
persons appropriately being treated the same way is uncontroversial. Whether this alone is enough
to lead us to speak of unequals being treated equally is more doubtful, and for our purposes not
very important.
32. J.R. Lucas, On Justice 171 (1980). A similar claim of justification underlay the highly
controversial exclusion of Japanese-Americans from the West Coast sustained by the Supreme
Court in Korcmatsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
33. Of course, one might say that each member of the pool is equally a suspect; but, as Lord
Halifax was aware, that is not sufficient to eliminate the sense of unfairness of firing them all,
perhaps in part because of the general assumption that people should not be treated as wrongdoers unless their wrongdoing is proven.
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unequal treatment is not only what two people deserve but also what will best
serve all immediate objectives, but may believe that equal treatment will
promote an important experimental objective.
Just as the principle that equals should be treated equally exerts an ethical
pull against the reasons for giving unequal treatment to equals, its corollary,
the principle that unequals should be treated unequally, exerts some ethical
pull against the reasons for giving equal treatment to unequals. This is not
necessarily to say that the respective principles are commonly perceived to
have the same degree of force. Virtually any administrable program demands
rough categorizations that predictably will lead to equal treatment of persons
understood to be relevantly unequal in relation to desert or the purposes of the
program. Moreover, at least in modern western culture, people usually feel a
more acute resentment when those they deem equal are treated better than
they are (e.g., given a higher salary) than when those they feel are relevantly
less deserving are treated equally (e.g., given the same salary). Perhaps for
both these reasons, the equal treatment of unequals often strikes us as less
unjust than the unequal treatment of equals.

C. The Presumption of Equality
Can we draw from the principle that equals should be treated equally any
conclusion about what should be done when uncertainty exists whether two
persons (or entities) are relevantly equal or unequal? Westen suggests that a
presumption in favor of equality is warranted only if persons are more often
equal in relevant characteristics than they are unequal. 34 This claim disregards
or misperceives the circumstances for choice when one is wholly uncertain
about possible relevant differences.
We may think of a presumption of this sort as having two possible
effects. One would be that in the absence of reasons to treat persons unequally, they should be treated equally. A second would be that when reasons
exist both for and against equal treatment, equal treatment should be given
unless the reasons for unequal treatment are stronger. Westen's position is
basically sound in respect to the second possibility. 35 If reasons appear for
giving A more benefits than B and other equally powerful reasons appear for
giving them the same benefits, a preference for equal treatment could only be
based on some more general assumption about relevant characteristics 36 or
upon a normative judgment that failures to give deserved equal treatment are
graver wrongs than failures to give deserved unequal treatment. 37 Neither of
these bases is supplied by the formal principles.

34. Westen, supra note I, at 574.
35. This is true even though his discussion is directed at the first possibility, id. at 571-75,
and it is far from clear that he even considers the second.
36. Westen talks about "a judgment that people are alike in more morally significant
respects than they are unalike," id. at 574; but an actual decision might well narrow the class of
relevant instances in some manner-e.g., are people usually alike in respect to some particular
sort of benefit or burden?
37. See id.
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Westen's position is not sound with respect to cases in which no specific
reasons for unequal treatment can be adduced. 38 Imagine that a judge is
unsure whether two offenders jointly responsible for a criminal result deserve
the same or different sentences. He thinks they probably deserve different
penalties because of likely different levels of culpability, but he neither perceives any relevant difference in characteristics nor has any intuition39 as to
which offender warrants a heavier penalty. How can he possibly suppose he
should give one a more severe sentence than the other when he has no idea
which offender warrants the harsher penalty? The judge minimizes the magnitude of his probable error by giving each the penalty that fulfills his best
estimate of what is most appropriate, 40 and that will be the same penalty for
both. 41 In the absence of apparent reasons for unequal treatment, the principle that equals should be treated equally does lead to a presumption in favor
of equality. Even when persons are plainly unequal (say one, and only one, of
two children of the same maturity has broken a window, but the parents come
up with no basis for suspecting one more than the other), 42 equal treatment
may be the only appropriate step when no discoverable ground exists for
treating one more harshly than the other.
The presumption of equality as thus elaborated cannot alone help resolve
what should be done when the choice is between treatments that are equal in
different respects, since the formal principle of equality cannot itself provide
guidance on which sorts of equality are more important than others. More
particularly, the presumption alone does not guide those who must decide
between intervention that will render the circumstances of "equals" more
equal or nonintervention that will leave those circumstances to be determined
by "natural," or other outside, forces. Consistent nonintervention is, after
all, one form of equal treatment. Even if the presumption is unhelpful for
choices between kinds of equal treatment, that does not, as Westen supposes,

38. As indicated supra note 35, these are actually the cases he apparently has in mind.
39. I pass over whether an unsupported intuition would be an appropriate basis for differentiation.
40. I disregard the complexity that the penalty that appears more likely than any other to be
most appropriate might carry a graver risk of damage if it proves not to be appropriate.
41. The point can be illustrated mathematically with some artificial assumptions. The judge
coucludes that there is one chance in three that A and B should both get four-year sentences, one
chance in three that A should get five years and B should get three years, and one chance in three
that B should get five years and A should get three years. If he sentences both to four years, he has
one chance in three of being right, and two chances in three of imposing one unneeded year and of
failing to impose one needed year-a total of two years. (I assume that undersentencing is just as
bad as oversentencing.) His probable error if he sentences both to four years is one-and-one-third
years (i.e., 2 x 2/3 = 1-1/3). If he sentenced one to five years and one to three years, he would
have a one-third chance of being right, a one-third chance of imposing one year of unneeded
sentence and of failing to impose one year of needed sentence (i.e., if each should have gotten
four years), and a one-third chance of imposing two years of unneeded sentence and of failing to
impose two years of needed sentence (i.e., if he reverses the appropriate sentences). His probable
mistake is two years (i.e., 1/3 x 2 + 1/3 x 4 = 2).
42. Lord Halifax's firing of all the members of the secretarial pool is another illustration.
See supra text accompanying note 28.
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render it "totally indeterminate." 43 It comes into play when some form of
treatment must be dispensed to a group of persons (a teacher is grading papers
or a judge is sentencing offenders) and the factors that render treatment
significantly equal or significantly unequal are clear (what matters for a grade
is the grade itself, not the color ink one uses to write it).
In its minimal form the presumption of equality casts a burden on the
proponent of unequal treatment to explain why such treatment is warranted,
and it requires equal treatment if no reason (or only patently unacceptable
reasons) are forthcoming. If one supposes that unjustified unequal treatment
is a graver wrong than unjustified equal treatment, then the presumption of
equality can also have force when reasons for equal and unequal treatment
seem about evenly balanced. Though the required supposition about the
comparative magnitude of the two kinds of wrongs is not derivable from the
formal principles, it does have a certain plausibility, as I have indicated at the
close of the last section.
The rational-basis test used to assess ordinary classifications that are
claimed to violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution can be
understood as a form of the minimal version of the presumption of equality.
The defenders of a legislative or administrative rule must present some legally
acceptable 44 reason why those who are worse off under the rule should be
dealt with differently from those who are better off. 45 for the rule to survive,
the state needs not only a legitimate reason for treating the claimants the way
that it does-that reason would suffice to meet a straightforward substantive
due process attack; the state must also have a legitimate reason for drawing
the lines of inclusion and exclusion as it does. 46 The potential stringency of
this genuinely comparative test depends on a number of related factors: how
freely the courts label purposes as impermissible, how strictly they review
whether asserted permissible reasons in fact produced the classification and
are genuinely served by i.t, how tightly they require that the permissible
reasons for the classifications be tied to the major purposes of the rule
involved. 47 I do not wish here to show that rational-basis review under the

43. See Westen, supra note 1, at 574-75. He also speaks of the presumption as "essentially
meaningless." Id. at 571.
44. Legally unacceptable reasons would include those based on constitutionally forbidden
ends (e.g., suppression of religious views) and on other ends that bear no relationship to the public
welfare (e.g., that individual legislators will be made wealthy by the bribes of those favored).
45. If the rule confers a benefit, the challenge will come from someone not covered by it; if it
imposes a burden, the challenger will be someone on whom its burden is imposed.
46. Westen, thus, oversimplifies matters when he says that "lw]hatever merit rationality
review has must ultimately derive not from notions of equality but from notions of substantive
due process." ld. at 577. One may believe that, properly conceived, substantive due process does
include all valid claims of improper classification: on this view, Westen's conclusion that all
rationality review derives from substantive due process could be defended; but the reason would
be that substantive due process incorporates equality notions.
47. In its traditional formulation, the test requires that the ground of difference be related to
"the object of the legislation." F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
That position has been criticized. Obviously, if the defendants can rely on any subsidiary purpose
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equal protection clause should be given more, or less, potency than it now
possesses, only to elucidate the similarity of that review to the presumption of
equality in moral evaluation.
In summary, respecting the formal principles, the classic formulas about
treatment of equals and unequals are neither so trivial nor so devoid of moral
significance as Professor Westen supposes; they both exercise directive influence over social choices and state powerful ethical reasons for consistent
compliance with standards that have been set.
III.

SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY

A. The Nature of Substantive Norms of Equality

In order to decide what persons are relevantly equal or unequal, substantive judgments have to be made about what characteristics count. When a
judgment is made that those, and only those, who get a grade of over seventy
should pass, the standard is set in terms of what appears likely to be the most
appropriate treatment for each person within the designated classes. No substantive judgment about equality need inform development of the standard.
In other circumstances, however, the particular determination about appropriate treatment is approached with presuppositions that some sorts of variances among individuals or groups are not warranted. For example, parents
are trying to decide whether to afford musical instruction to each of two
nonidentical twins. Recognizing that one child would probably benefit much
more than the other, the parents, nonetheless, decide at the outset (in order to
forestall resentment) that either both will be offered the opportunity or neither
will. In such a setting, the final conclusion that includes equal treatment is not
simply a derivation from independent resolution about the treatment most
appropriate for each individual; rather the conclusion rests in part on a
substantive norm of equality.
Substantive norms of equality are of various sorts and their relationships
to other norms and values are highly complex. In the example concerning
musical instruction, the parents believe that the benefit should be conferred on
both children or upon neither child, so that the children should be treated
equally in terms of the benefit. The parental decision in favor of equal
treatment is focused upon a particular concrete choice and upon particular
individuals, with the characteristics that determine equality having already
been set for the individuals. Other norms of equality differ in one or more of
these respects. Many norms of equality do not indicate precisely which persons will be treated equally but that the satisfaction of certain criteria will lead
to treatment in a designated way or to equal treatment. If legislators decide,
for example, that sentencing discretion is unfair and that all those who
commit any specific crime should receive the same sentence, a norm of
equality would inform their deliberations over what sentencing structure to
the makers of a rule might have had for favoring one group rather than another, very few
classifications will be without some legitimate reason.
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establish, a norm cast in terms of presently unidentified individuals who will
commit crimes in the future. This norm differs from the one affecting the
parents of the two children in that it is directed to large groups of individuals
and makes future behavior the key to one's treatment, but the two norms are
similar in their statement of positive conditions for equal treatment and their
attention to one problem of choice.
Other norms are formulated in terms of exclusion of factors from consideration, declaring that those factors are to be regarded as irrelevant. Parents
of a boy and girl might decide, for example, that gender will not affect their
treatment of the two children. A law may forbid consideration of race, ethnic
origin, or religion in hiring. Because those norms leave open the possible use
of an otherwise unlimited number of criteria for choice, they do not determine
that any two individuals or any specifiable groups of individuals will actually
receive the same benefits and burdens. Most ethical and legal norms against
discrimination are so formulated. 48 Often they are put at a high level of
generality; constitutional norms, for example, forbid certain types of discrimination by the government across the entire range of its activities.
Much more might be said about varieties of substantive norms of equality, but the preceding is sufficient to suggest their important place in deliberations over how people are to be treated. Two rather different challenges might
be raised to this brief account. One would be to deny that what 1 have
discussed are properly considered norms of equality at all; the second would
be to deny the significance of these norms. The first of these challenges is
taken up immediately below, the second in the following Section.
B. Norms of Equality and Comparative Norms Generally
Westen explicitly argues that what I call substantive norms of equality are
not norms of equality. Using as an illustration the requirement of the privileges and immunities clause of article IV that states give equal treatment to
citizens of sister states, he talks of "conditional rights" that require "quantitatively identical treatment. " 49 These rights, he says, are merely a subset of all
comparative rights; the fact that they demand quantitatively identical treatment "is a contingency . . . with no moral significance for purposes of
equality." so
As far as the terminological question is concerned, Westen's position is,
putting it mildly-odd; except insofar as that position is merely the logical
working through of his determination to define the formal principle of equality in an exceedingly narrow way and to foreclose use of the language of

48. Occasionally, equal treatment for different groups is taken to involve allocation of
benefits proportionately among groups. In a liberal democracy this sort of equal treatment is
likely to be supported only as a corrective device for past discrimination based on group membership, or as a device to prevent such discrimination in the future.
49. See Westen, supra note 1, at 554-55.
50. Id. at 555.

1180

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:1167

equality for any other claims. Westen is indisputably correct that some comparative norms are not cast in the language of equality, e.g., privates will
receive one-half the pay given to lieutenants. He is also correct in suggesting
that norms requiring the same treatment can be viewed as a subset of the
broader category of comparative norms. But he flies in the face of any
ordinary understanding of the term "equality" in denying that norms that
require people to be treated the same way are norms of equality. If it is a claim
of equality that people similarly subject to an established standard should be
treated the same way (Westen's version of the formal principle of equality), 51
surely claims that people should be treated the same way with regard to one or
many benefits or burdens because they share relevant characteristics, and
claims that people should not be denied the same treatment on the basis of
irrelevant differences (such as race or gender), are also claims of equality. A
drastic alteration in the usual sense of what "equality" covers would be
needed to accomplish the sharp distinction Westen proposes between rights to
equality and rights to quantitatively identical treatment. I reserve for the
conclusion comment on the possible benefits of such radieal surgery on the
concept of equality.
Although Westen helps clarify the similarities between substantive norms
of equality (in my terminology) and other comparative norms, he seriously
underestimates the significance of the former. A sense that some people
deserve better or worse treatment than others is fairly common, but rarely is
that sense reducible to a quantitative formulation; simple equality has an
intuitive appeal as a proper proportion that does not often exist for other
explicit proportions. Thus, substantive norms of equality enjoy prominence
among the norms that precisely define one person's or group's benefits in
relation to another's. Another reason why norms of equality oceupy a special
place among comparative norms is that all norms that preclude reliance on
characteristics deemed to be irrelevant are norms of equality; they demand
that equal treatment be given to persons who are alike in other respects and
differ only in regard to the irrelevant characteristics. sz Since we live in an era
when many previously accepted bases for differentiating among people are
now thought improper, and when public action to prevent private choiees on
those bases is deemed acceptable, the significance of these preelusive norms
has greatly increased.
C. The Significance of Substantive Norms of Equality

Much more troublesome than the terminological quarrel is the problem
of how substantive norms of equality relate to other comparative and to

51. As earlier discussion indicates, see supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text, I believe
this is too narrow a construction of even the formal principle, which applies whenever a firm
determination is made that people should be treated similarly in respect to a particular kind of
treatment, whether or not the precise treatment has yet been settled.
52. One might imagine a norm that permitted some reliance on a characteristic but not too
much, e.g., a state law that allowed employers to add no more than ten points to one's perform-
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noncomparative norms. I shall not here attempt the deep philosophical analysis that would be needed to probe their structural relationships in a systematic
way, but I do wish to establish that, at the level of ordinary moral and legal
discourse, many norms of equality are not easily derivative from, or reducible
to, noncomparative norms. A norm of equality could be derivative in the
sense of adding nothing significant to another norm or in the sense of merely
summing up the conclusions of a series of applications of other norms.
Suppose there is general agreement that a country's sole aim in picking
Olympic runners is to choose those who are fastest in their events, 53 because
picking the fastest runners is regarded as best overall for the country and its
sports programs, or because the fastest are believed to have a moral right to be
chosen. To say that equal treatment should be given to equally fast runners, 54
or that race or hair color should not be taken into account, would add nothing
to the norm that speed on the track should be the only criterion of choice.
Someone might say more generally that hair color should not be taken into
account for social choices, meaning no more than that thus far hair color has
not emerged as relevant to any of the purposes underlying those choices.
Conceivably a society might even try to simplify decisionmaking by explicitly
barring consideration of factors determined to be irrelevant on many earlier
occasions, because they consistently bore no relation to the purposes of a wide
range of decisions. Then, a genuine norm of equality would exist, but one that
was derivative from the positive standards for making particular previous
decisions and the aim of administrative convenience.
Often, however, norms of equality are something more than reflections
of factors deemed relevant for particular kinds of decisions. They are based
on belief that substantial reasons of a general kind exist for eschewing or
forbidding criteria of choice whether or not those criteria bear some plausible
relation to the particular kind of decision to be made. 55 Any use of race or
religion as a classification device may, for example, be thought likely to
fortify irrational prejudices and to cause social divisiveness by encouraging
people to think along racial or religious lines. Thus it may be thought that
such classifications should not be made even if they might bear some plausible

ance on an exam because of one's status as a veteran. Such discrimination-reducing norms would
not be norms of equality.
53. I pass over the serious practical (and partly normative) problem of how the fastest
runners are to be determined, whether by performance on one occasion or over a series of
occasions, or by some other method.
54. Of course, if two equally fast runners were competing for a single remaining place, both
could not be given the place. Then the formal principle of equality would be brought to bear to
decide upon a method of selection that would recognize the equality of the two runners. (Alternatively, some subsidiary purpose, say to build for the future by choosing the younger runner, might
be introduced to resolve ties.)
55. The government for the most part leaves private citizens and enterprises to decide for
themselves whether criteria they use for choices bear a plausible relation to the purposes underlying the choices. When the government enters the domain of private choice by barring private
discrimination, it singles out and prohibits the use of certain standards.
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relation to the purposes underlying the distribution of a particular benefit or
burden.
As written or interpreted, a number of constitutional provisions, including the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, the privileges
and immunities clause of article IV, and the speech and religion clauses of the
first amendment, contain norms of equality. The point is easily illustrated
under the equal protection clause by doctrines stating that classifications
based on race, national origin, gender, etc. must meet either strict scrutiny or
"intermediate review." These standards go beyond generalizations based on
the past inaptness of the specified criteria in particular instances and reflect
the view that use of those criteria is generally undesirable. The norms are not
absolute, but exceptions require relatively powerful justifications.
In both moral and legal discourse the relation between a norm of equality
and other norms and values can be complicated. The principle that the government should not distribute benefits or burdens on religious grounds is a
substantive norm of equality. The principle that the government should not
encourage or discourage any sort of religious faith is (essentially) a noncomparative norm. The norm against distribution based on religious criteria is
something more than a restatement of the norm against encouragement; but
once it is perceived that by keying benefits or burdens to religious belief or
affiliation, the government may indirectly encourage one kind of religion and
discourage another, the first norm can be thought to be derivable from the
second. 56 In right-to-travel cases, the Supreme Court has said that generally a
state may not treat new residents worse than old ones. A critical part of the
argument of the new residents has concerned comparative disadvantage; 57 yet
if the basis for the norm of equality is itself drawn from the more fundamental
norm that liberty to travel should not be penalized or discouraged, the equality norm plays a definitely subordinate role. Professor Westen is correct to
criticize the Supreme Court's unnecessary employment of the equal protection
clause in cases in which the real work is done by right, such as the right to
travel, derived from another part of the Constitution. 58
On some occasions a norm of equality is not so easily derivable from
another specific norm, but may serve some general value, such as social
harmony. The argument that religious preferences should not be employed
because they cause social divisiveness is of this sort. One might posit a norm
that the government should not cause social divisiveness and claim that the
norm against religious preferences can be derived from it. But a norm about
social divisiveness is very vague and obviously the government must do many

56. I by no means wish to suggest that this is the only basis of the norms against use of
religious criteria for government benefits.
57. This is true at least in cases where the new residents have complained that they have been
deprived of a benefit that the state legitimately could have denied to all its residents. Admittedly,
if a state were obligated to provide a given benefit to its residents, the claim of the new residents
who had been deprived of the benefit would not necessarily be rooted in principles of equality.
58. See Westen, supra note 1, at 560-64.
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things that do cause some degree of social divisiveness (such as fight wars or
refrain from fighting wars). The norm against religious preferences cannot be
derived from the more general norm in any easy, straightforward way.
Norms of equality often rest on fundamental value assumptions or norms
that are themselves egalitarian, for example, that all people should be accorded equal respect by their government. Moreover, these assumptions
hardly seem reducible to any nonegalitarian norms or values. 59 The premise
underlying the reapportionment cases, that voters in state elections should
have votes equal in weight, may be of this kind. 60 Just as norms of equality
can be grounded in nonegalitarian norms, so can the converse occur. A norm
that an advanced society should afford its citizens roughly equal opportunity
in life can be used to support a noncomparative right to a minimal level of
nutritional and medical support. An egalitarian norm that all people's conceptions of the good should count equally in a liberal democracy could be used to
derive a nonegalitarian norm that any claim to benefits based on the correctness of the claimant's special conception of the good is without moral force. 61
Though these comments barely hint at the subtle relationships between
different sorts of norms, they are sufficient to suggest the importance of
substantive norms of equality and to indicate the absence of any simple oneway street, or process of derivation, between other norms and egalitarian
norms.

IV.

CONCLUSION:

THE

LANGUAGE OF EQUALITY

This brief examination has shown some of the complexities of the idea of
equality and has demonstrated that though formal and substantive norms of
equality are both often subordinate in various ways to other norms, they are
neither logically self-evident nor ethically empty. Equal treatment can be
unjust, and unequal treatment can be just. 02 Substantive norms of equality
can be the basis for excluding some kinds of moral and legal claims, such as
the claim based on one's special conception of the good. These norms can also
limit the permissible scope or affect the weight of various sorts of claims in
favor of unequal treatment. Similarly, substantive norms of equality can
preclude use of certain forms of classification altogether, limit the possible

59. This is true unless all egalitarian norms are thought to be supported by the need for social
harmony.
60. Westen's discussion of these cases, Westen, supra note 1, at 594-95, is somewhat
puzzling. He argues that reliance on principles of equality in the voting rights cases was misleading, since different notions of equality would have yielded different holdings. Toward that end, he
suggests that Justice Harlan's position in dissent in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589 (1964),
could have been put as supporting equality of votes within each legislative district. Id. at 595. But
that characterization would hardly have been an adequate response in terms of equality to the
majority's assumption that equality of weight within and among districts was required.
61. Bruce Ackerman proposes such a principle in B. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal
State 11 (1980).
62. Westen disagrees: "Claims that treatment can be simultaneously just and unequal, or
equal but unjust, are grounded in simple self-contradiction." Westen, supra note I, at 558.
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subject matters for other forms of classifications, and influence the weight of
the reasons necessary to justify still other forms of classifications. At least in
our society, the formal principle of equality is the basis for a presumption in
favor of equality, implicitly demanding some explanation for unequal treatment. It exerts a moral force against using some techniques of distributing
benefits and burdens (such as experiments) for which there may be rational
reasons; and it limits the permissible methods for choosing among equals
when a choice must be made. The formal principle also embodies a moral
judgment about one element of the wrong done to someone when an applicable standard for conferring benefits is not followed.
Professor Westen's claim that equality is empty has been shown to be
based on his extraordinarily narrow conception of what equality means, a
conception that excludes substantive norms of equality altogether and sharply
constricts the range of the formal principle of equality as well. His recommendation that the language of equality cease to be used in moral and political
discourse does not rest on the assumption that all the claims now cast in that
language are really meaningless, but rather that some better vocabulary is
available for making and considering them.
Any proposal for improving the conceptual terminology presently in use
must face an obvious difficulty. No one is in a position to dictate usage,
though the Supreme Court and other institutions do have a powerful influence
on legal usage. Even if an alternative vocabulary would be preferable, it is
doubtful if part of a select elite should simply abandon the terms presently
used by most persons. If some people do abandon the old terms, then similar
arguments will be made in vastly different vocabularies, itself a considerable
source of potential confusion. In any event, whatever usage one chooses for
oneself, one must understand the ideas that others are conveying in the less
than ideal alternative vocabulary. As a practical program, one could, thus,
hardly recommend instant cessation of use of the language of equality or
thought about what that language seeks to communicate. What one could
sensibly recommend is the introduction of alternative ways of speaking and an
effort over time to shift to those preferable modes.
If Westen's position is correct, such a program would be justified by the
confusions generated by the language of equality. This position is difficult to
evaluate for two very important reasons. The first is that no major concept of
moral and political discourse that is taken from ordinary language is free of
considerable confusion. Terms like "privacy," "freedom," and "right" have
their own uncertain dimensions and multiplicity of senses. I should be surprised if the idea of equality is either more confused or more complex than
these other ideas. What is perhaps more to the point, I am skeptical that one
could find a new vocabulary that one could introduce into the stream of
general usage that would not quickly develop its own ambiguities and confusions. The second reason why Westen's proposal is hard to evaluate is because
it is always difficult to say how far developments in moral and legal evaluation
are the product of intellectual confusion. Certainly the historical progression
toward greater equality in political rights and social opportunities is not
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mainly the result of some misplaced extension of the formal principle of
equality, but rather of the sense that previously accepted distinctions are
morally unjustified. Perhaps the self-evidence of the formal principle of
equality does diffuse a certain glow that reaches substantive claims of equality
that are highly debatable. But the principle, after all, does share with these
claims a concern for equal treatment that unifies all the aspects of the idea of
equality; and whether choice of a new vocabulary could somehow divert
attention from that unifying element is highly dubious.
One very important impediment to abandoning equality language in legal
discourse is the vast amount of law that has been developed under the equal
protection clause (as well as other norms that use the language of equality). 63
Especially if one thinks that the critical decisions have been legally sound and
socially beneficial, he will be hesitant to abandon their present moorings or to
concede that interpretation of the equal protection clause should not employ
the concept of equality. If the concept of equality is to retain its present
importance in legal discourse, attempts to develop a different vocabulary for
nonlegal discourse would probably not contribute to clarity and would likely
fail.
In sum, while one cannot be sure whether a change in vocabulary would
produce greater clarification or more appropriate resolution of issues, there
are strong bases for skepticism. Especially in light of the difficulties of causing
such a change, even were it desirable, a more sensible program for clarification is to promote understanding of the present richness of the ideas of
equality that now form a central part of our moral and legal thought.

63. Kenneth Karst provides a powerful account of the uses of the concept of equality in the
history of American political discussion and law. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 Ga. L. Rev.
245 (1983).

